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INTRODUCTION

In Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, a seemingly innocuous
eleven-page slip opinion, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. made manifest
that the communicative effects of any law are considered speech subject to
some level of scrutiny under the First Amendment.' In some ways, that
conclusion is the logical extension of an ever-expanding view starting in the

Mr. Snyder earned his J.D., summa cum laude, from Texas Wesleyan University
and his B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy. Mr. Gann earned his J.D. from the
University of Virginia School of Law and his B.A., summa cum laude, from Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University. Both were 2016-2017 term law clerks to the
Honorable Eugene E. Siler Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Both
would like to thank Chelsea N. Evans and the entire staff of the South CarolinaLaw Review
for a top-notch job. And both would like to thank their wives for their support and willingness
to spend one year in London, Kentucky, with us.
1.
See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150-51 (2017)
("Those written or oral communications would be speech, and the law by determining the
amount charged would indirectly dictate the content of that speech .... Because it
concluded otherwise, the Court of Appeals had no occasion to conduct a further inquiry into
whether § 518, as a speech regulation, survived First Amendment scrutiny.").
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1920s of what constitutes speech under the First Amendment. 2 By
recognizing that behavior influenced by law constitutes speech,
Schneiderman achieved a quiet acme for an idea many have already come to
accept. 3 That almost anything could be construed as speech was inevitable
given the unremitting trajectory of jurisprudence in this area. 4 But
Schneiderman also portends a vehicle to challenge any law as abridging
free-speech rights.5 In a different era, and under a different constitutional
provision, the Supreme Court scrutinized, and often ruled as
unconstitutional, many governmental laws and regulations. 6 In 1905,
Lochner v. United States recognized a potent weapon against business
regulation: the right to contract under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Not until
1937 did the Court revisit and decline to continue recognizing such a right as
a bulwark against democratically enacted laws.8 The Lochner era is often a
term of opprobrium 9; yet the case still has its champions.' 0 Is Schneiderman
the new Lochner?

2.
Speech

See Geoffrey R. Stone & Eugene Volokh, A Common Interpretation: Freedom of
and

the

Press,

NAT'L

CONST.

CTR.:

CONST.

DAILY

(Dec.

1,

2016),

https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/a-common-interpretation-freedom-of-speech-and-the-press
("But starting in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began to read the First Amendment more
broadly, and this trend accelerated in the 1960s. Today, the legal protection offered by the First
Amendment is stronger than ever before in our history.").
3.
See id.
4.
See id.
5.
See Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Merchants Seem to Fall Short in Challenge
to New York Statute Banning Credit-Card "Surcharges,"SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2017, 10:49
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-merchants-seem-fall-short-chall
enge-new-york-statute-banning-credit-card-surcharges/ ("Breyer plainly saw the case through
the lens of traditional pricing regulation and worried that any serious scrutiny of the statute
threatened to cast a shadow on economic regulations long considered plainly valid .... ).
6.
See Andrew Hamm, Dueling Perspectives on Lochner v. United States,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 3, 2016, 1:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/duelingperspectives-on-lochner-v-united-states/.
7.
See id. ("In a five-to-four opinion written by Justice Rufus Peckham, the Court
struck down the regulation on the ground that it violated an individual's liberty of contract,
which the majority held was implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.").
8.
See David Kopel, Online Symposium: The Bar Review Version ofNFIB v. Sebelius,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 6, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/onlinesymposium-the-bar-review-version-of-nfib-v-sebelius/ (providing an overview of three 1937
cases overruling Lochner-erarestrictions on Congress's authority).
9.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2615-16 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) ("In reality, however, the majority's approach has no basis in principle or tradition,
except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that characterized discredited
decisions such as Lochner. . . .").
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Identifying Schneiderman as a without bound endorsement that conduct
influenced by law is speech for purposes of the First Amendment, this paper
argues that litigants may use the case to challenge any law or regulation-at
least at some level. In three parts, this paper reviews Lochner and its
atmospherics, delineates the Court's first-speech jurisprudence through
Schneiderman, and discusses how Schneiderman presents a renewed
opportunity to challenge any law or regulation. This paper does not take a
position on whether the Court was correct in Lochner, and this paper does
not weigh in on whether principles emanating from Lochner could or should
salve modem dilemmas. This paper, at bottom, addresses the litigation-tactic
consequences of Schneiderman and the implications that arise from the
decision.
II.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LOCHNER ERA

In 1895, the New York state legislature passed the Bakeshop Act." The
legislature used the British Bakehouse Regulation Act of 1863 as a model,
thereby seeking to ameliorate certain sanitation and working conditions.12
Section 110 stated that "no employee shall be required or permitted to work
in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionary establishment more than
sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day."13
Joseph Lochner owned Lochner's Home Bakery,' 4 and he was charged
with violating the Bakeshop Act on the basis that one of his employees
worked longer than sixty hours in one week.' 5 The state government fined
Mr. Lochner $25 for the violation.1 6 In 1901, Mr. Lochner was charged once
again with a similar violation:" "the defendant, 'wrongfully and unlawfully
required and permitted an employee working for him in his biscuit, bread,

10. See Hamm, supra note 6 ("Lochner has 'not enjoyed a good reputation, to put it
mildly,' Kens asserts, 'and it deserves that reputation.' But Barnett countered that the case was
'[p]robably the right decision."').
11. See Joshua Waimberg, Lochner v. New York: Fundamental Rights and Economic
Liberty, NAT'L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Oct. 26, 2016), https://constitution
center.org/blog/lochner-v-new-york-fundamental-rights-and-economic-liberty.
12. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Lochner v. New York: Law Case, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Lochner-v-New-York#refl 182114
(last

visited Mar. 30, 2017).
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 n.1 (1905).
14.

Waimberg, supra note 11.

15.
16.
17.

See id.
See id.
See id.
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and cake bakery and confectionary establishment, at the city of Utica, in this
county, to work more than sixty hours in one week."" Mr. Lochner filed a
demurrer, arguing, among other things, that "the facts stated did not
constitute a crime."' 9 The Oneida County Court denied the demurrer, and
the case progressed to trial. 20 Mr. Lochner was convicted and "sentenced to
pay a fine of $50, and to stand committed until paid, not to exceed fifty days
in the Oneida County jail." 21
Mr. Lochner filed an appeal in the New York Appellate Division Fourth
Department, 22 arguing "that the regulations interfered with the right to earn a
living." 23 In a 3-2 opinion, the appellate division rejected the argument and
upheld his conviction. 24 Mr. Lochner filed an appeal in the New York Court
of Appeals, and that court affirmed in a 4-3 opinion. 25
Having exhausted his options in state court, Mr. Lochner petitioned for a
writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. During the pendency of his case
before the Court, he changed attorneys. 26 Mr. Lochner's new attorney,
Henry Weismann, had an acute understanding of and familiarity with the
Bakeshop Act. 27 Before becoming an attorney, Mr. Weismann was a
lobbyist for the Journeyman Bakers Union and proponent of the sixty-hour
work week codified in the Bakeshop Act. 28 From his experience as a
bakeshop owner, Mr. Weismann eventually became a skeptic of the law he
once supported because, in his view, the Bakeshop Act operated in a manner
"unjust to the employers." 29 With a matured view of the Bakeshop Act, Mr.
Weismann argued that the Constitution protected Mr. Lochner's right to
make a contract with an employee, free from governmental interference. 30
According to Mr. Weismann, "the treasured freedom of the
individual ... [is] swept away under the guise of the police power of the
State." 3 1

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46.
Id at 46-47.
See id at 47.
Id
See id.
Waimberg, supra note 11.
See id
See id.
See id.
See id
See id.
Id
See id
Id
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In a landmark (and infamous) 5-4 opinion, the Court agreed with Mr.
Lochner that the Bakeshop Act was an unconstitutional infringement on his
right to contract.32 Writing for the majority, Justice Rufus Peckham
concluded that "[t]he statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract
between employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in which
the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer." 33 Recognizing this
interference, Justice Peckman explained that "[t]he general right to make a
contract in relation to [Mr. Lochner's] business is part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 34
In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan, joined by Justices Edward
Douglass White and William R. Day, asserted that "the liberty of contract
may, within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and
calculated to promote the general welfare or to guard the public health, the
public morals or the public safety." 35 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
penned a solo dissent, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
embody the type of "paternalism" that the right to contract seems to assume
when thwarting democratically enacted laws:
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not
interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a
shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by
school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal
institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable,
whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. 36
Commentators thereafter have referred to the next thirty years as the
Lochner era, in which the Court ruled consistently that labor regulations are
unconstitutional. 37 The timeframe coincided with and stymied efforts to

32. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
33. Id.
34. Id (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
35. Id at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. Id at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316-17 (1936) (striking down
federal legislation regulating the coal industry); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77-78
(1936) (finding that the Agriculture Adjustment Act was an unconstitutional exercise of
power); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (striking down federal
legislation mandating a minimum wage level for women and children); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (striking down federal regulation of child labor); Adams v. Tanner,
244 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1917) (striking down state legislation preventing privately-owned
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secure New Deal legislation. The Court defiled from Lochner, voiding the
Agriculture Act of 193338 and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935,39 among others.40

Frustrated by an inability to pursue and secure his New Deal legislation,
and leveraging a landslide victory in the 1936 presidential election, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill
of 1937.41 This bill, commonly referred to as the "court packing plan,"
provided retirement at full pay for any justice of the Supreme Court over the
age of 70.42 President Roosevelt justified the bill under the auspice that a
justice's age could have a negative impact on the Court.4 3 Under its
prescribed terms, if a justice refused to retire, the President would have the
opportunity to appoint an "assistant" who could in turn vote on the outcome
of any case.44 This plan would, in effect, allow President Roosevelt to
"neutralize Supreme Court justices hostile to his New Deal."4 5
Before Congress could vote on the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of
1937, the Court through a shift in position by Justice Owen Robertsissued an opinion that made implementation of the "court packing plan"
unnecessary.4 6 In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,the Court was given the
opportunity to revisit an earlier decision in Adkins v. Children'sHospital.47
Adkins ruled unconstitutional a federal law mandating a minimum wage

employment agencies from assessing a fee); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915)
(concluding that it was outside the scope of the state-police power to prohibit employment
contracts that bar workers from joining a union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80
(1908) (striking down federal legislation prohibiting railroad companies from demanding that
a worker not join a labor union).
38. Butler, 297 U.S. at 77-78.
39. Carter, 298 U.S. at 316-17.
40. See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 561 (striking as unconstitutional federal legislation
mandating a minimum wage level for women and children in the District of Columbia, noting
that "[t]o sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution, is not to
strike down the common good but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot
be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its
constituent members").
41. See This Day in History: Roosevelt Announces "Court-Packing" Plan,
HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing
-plan (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id
46. Following the Supreme Court's decisions, the Senate struck down the Judicial
Procedures Reform Bill of 1937 by a vote of 70-22 in July 1937. See id.
47. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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level for women and children.4 8 In West Coast Hotel, the Court considered a
similar law under the State of Washington that "authorize[d] the fixing of
minimum wages for women and minors." 49 This time, with Justice Roberts's
famous "switch in time to save the nine," the Court upheld Washington's
minimum wage law as a valid regulation."o The Court observed, "[w]e think
that the views thus expressed are sound and [Adkins] was a departure from
the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the state of
the relation of employer and employed."'
Fourteen days later, the Court demonstrated that West Coast Hotel was
no outlier. This time, the Court was faced with determining the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.52 In National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court held that
Congress had the power, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate labor
relations. 53 The Court embraced an expansive view of federal power in the
area of contractual relations between employers and employees:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. 54
While neither West Coast Hotel nor Jones & Laughlin Steel explicitly
overruled Lochner, the erstwhile case had fallen. After Jones & Laughlin
Steel, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act of
1935 in two separate opinions.5 5 As the Court summed up nearly twenty
years after West Coast Hotel, "[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be

48. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 563 (1923).
49. West CoastHotel, 300 U.S. at 386.
50. See id. at 399-400.
51. Id at 397.
52. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22 (1937).
53. See id. at 37.
54. Id (citing Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
55. See Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639-41 (1937).
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unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." 5 6 Lochner had lost its deregulating force.
In some ways Lochner has become a slur, 8 invoked when rights are
read into the Constitution that the invoker believes should not exist.5 9 To
some, the expansion of individual rights has given rebirth to Lochner,
recasting deregulation on the basis of economic rights as deregulation on the
basis of fundamental rights. 60 Skeptics of this revitalized version of
substantive due process trace the concept of fundamental rights to footnote
four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., a 1938 opinion written by
Justice Harlan F. Stone, in which the Court observed a constitutional duty to
engage in a "more searching judicial inquiry" into the protection of "discrete
and insular minorities." 6 1 Whether jurisprudence in the area of fundamental
rights is misguided exceeds the scope of this paper. But when the
Constitution is used as a counter-majoritarian means to render a
governmental act unlawful, the typical refrain is to cite Lochner and cast the
decision as undermining democratically enacted laws. 62 Although the

56.

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (citations

omitted).
57. Some commentators argue that Lochner remains alive and well in the Court's
current fundamental rights jurisprudence. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era
Revisionism Revised: Lochner and the Origins of FundamentalRights Constitutionalism, 92
GEO. L.J. 1, 60 (2003) ("It turns out, however, that Griswold, Roe, and their progeny can be
traced back to Lochner .... Most prominent of these rights was liberty of contract, but the
Taft Court expanded Lochner to protect other rights as well, including freedom of speech and
the right to send one's child to private school.").
58. Ian Samuel & Dan Epps, OT2016 #11: "Close to Using a Swear, " FIRST MONDAYS
(Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.firstmondays.fm/episodes/2017/1/16/ot2016-11-close-to-using-aswear.

59.

See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,

dissenting) ("Rejecting Lochner does not require disavowing the doctrine of implied
fundamental rights, and this Court has not done so. But to avoid repeating Lochner's error of
converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates, our modern substantive due
process cases have stressed the need for 'judicial self-restraint."' (citation omitted)).

60.

See id. at 2617-18; see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2571 (2015)

(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "the Court began [to] shift[] the focus of its substantive
due process (and equal protection) jurisprudence from economic interests to 'discrete and
insular minorities').

61. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938)).
62. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 878 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The most basic is that we have eschewed attempts to provide any all-purpose,
top-down, totalizing theory of 'liberty.' That project is bound to end in failure or worse. The
Framers did not express a clear understanding of the term to guide us, and the now-repudiated
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concept of unenumerated fundamental rights what they are and whether
should they exist-is contentious, the latent emergence and understanding of
a certain enumerated right may prove to have the most expansive
deregulatory effect yet: the First Amendment's right to free speech.
III. A LOGICAL CONCLUSION OF EXPANSIVE FREE-SPEECH RIGHTS 100
YEARS IN THE MAKING: DOES SCHNEIDERMAN PRESAGE DEREGULATING
CONSEQUENCES?

Only in the past century has the Supreme Court began to exposit on the
contours of free-speech protection, culminating in the Schneiderman
principle that all conduct abiding by or violating law constitutes some form
of speech.63 How the Court has interpreted and reinterpreted the First
Amendment in the past century aids in understanding how Schneiderman
enables free-speech rights that intersect with and reinvent the potential of
Lochner.
A.

The Evolution ofFree-Speech Rights from Schenk to Schneiderman

The First Amendment makes plain that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 64 Although the First Amendment
says "Congress," the Supreme Court has held that speakers are protected
against the entire panoply of governmental agencies and actors, whether
federal, state, local, legislative, executive, or judicial.65 Yet the First
Amendment does not restrain private individuals or organizations-it limits
action by the government only.
The Supreme Court was reticent about the First Amendment until
1919.66 Then, in Schenck v. United States, the Court made explicit that, in
the words of Tom Goldstein (founder of the inimitable SCOTUSblog), it
"was going to take the First Amendment right to free speech seriously." 67
Shortly after the United States entered into World War I, Congress passed

Lochner line of cases attests to the dangers of judicial overconfidence in using substantive due
process to advance a broad theory of the right or the good." (internal footnote omitted)).
63. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017); see also
Stone & Volokh, supra note 2.

64.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

65. See Stone & Volokh, supra note 2.
66. Schenck v. United States, C-SPAN: LANDMARK CASES, http://landmarkcases.cspan.org/Case/5/Schenck-v-United-States (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).

67.

Id.
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the Espionage Act of 1917, aiming to prohibit interference with military
operations or recruitment, to prevent insubordination in the military, and to
stall support of hostile enemies during wartime. 68 Around that time, Charles
Schenck organized the distribution of 15,000 leaflets to prospective draftees,
using the following message in an attempt to persuade resistance to the draft:
"Long Live The Constitution Of The United States; Wake Up America!
Your Liberties Are in Danger!" 69 Mr. Schenck was arrested for, indicted on,
and convicted of "conspir[ing] to violate the Espionage Act ... by causing
and attempting to cause insubordination ... and to obstruct the recruiting
and enlistment service of the United States." 70
Mr. Schenck and one other individual sought to overturn their
convictions on grounds of their free-speech rights, but the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's judgment. 7 ' In a unanimous opinion, Justice
Holmes sketched that "in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their
constitutional rights." 72 Yet Justice Holmes reminded that "the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." 73 He
famously reflected that "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." 74
Upholding the convictions, Justice Holmes concluded that "[w]hen a nation
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right." 75
Roughly eight months later, in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes
dissented from an opinion affirming convictions under the same law and
under similar circumstances (i.e., one of the Abrams pamphlets read
"Workers

Wake

Up?"), 76

shifting

his

position

and

offering

the

marketplace-of-ideas stimulus for the modern interpretation of the First
Amendment:

68. See Joshua Waimberg, Schenck v. United States: Defining the Limits of Free
Speech,
NAT'L
CONST.
CTR.:
CONST.
DAILY
(Nov.
2,
2015),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/schenck-v-united-states-defining-the-limits-of-free-speech.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919).
See id. at 53.
Id at 52.
Id
Id
Id
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 625 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution.7 7
After Schenck and Abrams, at least in the context of constitutional
interpretation, the Court progressed at a rapid pace over the next hundred
years in expounding on and recognizing free-speech rights.7 ' Gitlow v. New
York, a case decided in 1925, incorporated the First Amendment against the
states through provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 In 1927, in
Whitney v. California, Justice Louis D. Brandeis contributed the idea that
political speech in particular should receive special protection as a
foundation on which government relies: "a State is, ordinarily, denied the
power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine
which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil
consequence."s0 Justice Brandeis also espoused the modern sentiment that
more speech is better than less speech: "If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.""
After Whitney, in 1931, the Court curtailed the government's ability to
censor or restrain speakers from publishing content.82 In 1939, a law

77. Id. at 630; see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (quoting and
endorsing the marketplace of ideas concept from Abrams).
78. See Stone & Volokh, supra note 2 ("But starting in the 1920s, the Supreme Court
began to read the First Amendment more broadly, and this trend accelerated in the 1960s.
Today the legal protection offered by the First Amendment is stronger than ever before in our
history.").
79. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45 n.1 (1994) ("The First Amendment
provides: 'Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .' The Fourteenth Amendment makes this limitation applicable to the States."); see
also Stone & Volokh, supra note 2.
80. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 377; see, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550 (citing with approval Whitney, 274
U.S. at 377).
82. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931) ("The general principle that the
constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press gives immunity from previous restraints has
been approved in many decisions under the provisions of state constitutions.") (citing Dailey v.
Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 98 (1896)).
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prohibiting all demonstrations in public parks or all leafleting on public
streets was held unconstitutional.8 3 In 1943, the Court recognized that
students could refrain from pledging allegiance to the flag, holding "[i]f
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein."84
After a brief waylay, the Warren Court reinvigorated a debate that
persisted beyond Chief Justice Earl Warren's tenure." In 1964, the Court
observed that an "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate," 8 6
requiring libelous allegations against news media to include a demonstration
that the false statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."" By 1965, civil rights and
anti-abortion protesters could not be silenced merely because passersby
could respond violently to their speech." In 1969, the Court permitted the
Ku Klux Klan to march on because "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." 89 That same year, the Court permitted highschool students to protest by wearing black armbands in school so long as
the conduct did not "materially and substantially" interfere with school
operations. 90 After 1971, people could wear jackets emblazoned with "Fuck

83. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ("Although a municipality may
enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these may
not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to those who wish to speak,
write, print or circulate information or opinion.").
84. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
85. See Stone & Volokh, supra note 2 ("There are generally three situations in which
the government can constitutionally restrict speech under a less demanding standard.").
86. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
87. Id. at 279-80.
88. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965) ("The situation is thus the same as
if the statute itself expressly provided that there could only be peaceful parades or
demonstrations in the unbridled discretion of the local officials. The pervasive restraint on
freedom of discussion by the practice of the authorities under the statute is not any less
effective than a statute expressly permitting such selective enforcement.").
89. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951)).
90. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (citing
Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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the Draft" on the back when entering courthouses. 9' In 1974, the Court
reaffirmed the "heavy presumption" against prior restraints, enabling the
publication of classified information. 92 By 1977, automobilists could cover
up state mottos found on issued license plates. 93
Unlike other areas of law, the Rehnquist Court carried on where the
Warren Court left off in the context of free-speech rights. 94 In 1989, flag
burning became protected speech. 95 In 1992, statutes prohibiting cross
burning could not be sustained as alleviating unprotected fighting words. 96
In 2000, the Court ruled unconstitutional a law compelling cable television
operators that broadcasted sexually-oriented programming to limit their
transmissions to hours when children were unlikely to view the material. 97
Although reiterating that obscene speech and child pornography are
unprotected, in 2002, the Court expounded that the government cannot
prevent the creation of computer images depicting sexually explicit images
of children.98

91. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("It is, in sum, our judgment that,
absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not,
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here
involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.").
92. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)
(citing Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
93. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) ("We conclude that the State of
New Hampshire may not require appellees to display the state motto upon their vehicle license
plates; and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.").
94. See Ronald Collins, Ask the Author: Paul Moke on Earl Warren-The Man & His
Measure, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 27, 2015, 12:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2015/ 11 /ask-the-author-paul-moke-on-earl-warren-the-man-his-measure/.
95. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) ("We decline, therefore, to create
for the flag an exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment.").
96. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) ("Let there be no mistake about
our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has
sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment
to the fire.").
97. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) ("When the
purpose and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its content, special
consideration or latitude is not accorded to the Government merely because the law can
somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression. We cannot be influenced,
moreover, by the perception that the regulation in question is not a major one because the
speech is not very important. The history of the law of free expression is one of vindication in
cases involving speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even ugly. It follows
that all content-based restrictions on speech must give us more than a moment's pause.").
98. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) ("The principal
question to be resolved, then, is whether the CPPA is constitutional where it proscribes a
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The Roberts Court has hastened the inexorable progression of freespeech rights. 99 In 2010, the Court concluded that a statute proscribing
videos of women crushing animals and other depictions of extreme animal
cruelty was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as "substantially
overbroad."'o That same year, corporations acquired free-speech rights.' 0
One year later, protesters had a constitutional right to brandish signs
proclaiming "God Hates F**s" and "God Hates the USA/Thank God for
9/11" outside a soldier's funeral.102 In 2012, the Court rendered
unconstitutional a federal law criminalizing false claims of being a recipient
of a military medal.1 03 In 2014, the Court constrained the government's
latitude to curb aggregate political contributions because spending money is
a form of speech.1 04 Returning to license plates, in 2015, the Court clarified
that a license plate itself can act as speech, if only on behalf of the
government. 0 5 Schneiderman is the most recent evolution in this area.

significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller nor child pornography under
Ferber.").
99. Ronald Collins, The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (July
9, 2013, 11:34 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/the-roberts-court-and-the-firstamendment/ ("By that measure, the Roberts Court has sometimes enriched the First
Amendment by way of unprecedented protection, while at other times it has devalued the
currency of that fundamental freedom.").
100. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464-66, 482 (2010) ("We therefore
need not and do not decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of
extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional. We hold only that § 48 is not so limited but is
instead substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment.").
101. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
102. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447-48, 458 (2011).
103. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) ("Although the statute
covers respondent's speech, the Government argues that it leaves breathing room for protected
speech, for example, speech which might criticize the idea of the Medal or the importance of
the military. The Government's arguments cannot suffice to save the statute.").
104. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) ("The
Government has a strong interest, no less critical to our democratic system, in combatting
corruption and its appearance. We have, however, held that this interest must be limited to a
specific kind of corruption-quid pro quo corruption--in order to ensure that the
Government's efforts do not have the effect of restricting the First Amendment right of
citizens to choose who shall govern them. For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the
aggregate limits on contributions do not further the only governmental interest this Court
accepted as legitimate in Buckley.").
105. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253
(2015) ("For the reasons stated, we hold that Texas's specialty license plate designs constitute
government speech and that Texas was consequently entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring
SCV's proposed design.").
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Schneiderman Caps How Conduct OrientedAround Law Implicates
the FirstAmendment

Schneiderman represented a battle between merchants and credit-card
networks over the surcharges that merchants pay when they accept cards in
retail transactions. 106 In 1976, Congress banned surcharges at the federal
level but allowed that ban to lapse in 1984. 107 New York then passed its law
using the same language as the lapsed federal statute.'0o The law was for
many years almost irrelevant because credit-card networks imposed similar
rules in their merchant contracts. 109 Multibillion-dollar antitrust settlements,
spearheaded by retailers like Wal-Mart, eliminated many of those
contractual restrictions, thereby resurrecting the salience of the law against
surcharges."1 0 At all times relevant, the states with laws similar to New York
included California, Florida, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Texas."' Conventional understanding
suggested that the laws did not prevent discounts for cash just the added
surprise of a surcharge on top of the advertised price.11 2 According to
Professor Ronald Mann, "the distinction between offering a discount for
cash (or checks) and imposing a surcharge for cards might seem like a small
thing, but the protracted legislative battles over the question show that both
merchants and card networks think the difference is crucial.""13
Five merchants challenged the New York anti-surcharge statute on the
basis of their free-speech rights, arguing that the law prevented merchants
from using the word "surcharge" as a way to describe the higher price they

106. See Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: MerchantsBring Payment-CardInterchange
Wars to the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan.
3, 2017,
5:06 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-preview-merchants-bring-payment-card-interch
ange-wars-supreme-court/ [hereinafter Argument Preview].
107. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017);
Daniel Fisher, Cash Price or Credit? Supreme Court Says That Might Be First Amendment
Question, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2017/03/29/cashprice-or-credit-supreme-court-says-that-might-be-first-amendment-question/2/#4ffal 5703862.
108. See Adam Liptak, Justices Side with Free-Speech Challenge to Credit Card Fees,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/supreme-courtcredit-card-fees.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0.
109. See id.
110. See Fisher, supra note 107.
111. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rules Merchants May Pursue Free-Speech
Challenge to Disclose Credit Card Fees, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017, 1:30 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-creditcard-fees-20170329-story.html.
112. See Argument Preview, supra note 106.
113. Id.
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charge to credit-card users." 4 In 2013, District Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York preliminarily
enjoined enforcement of the law on the basis that preventing merchants from
describing how surcharges fit into pricing abridges their right to free
speech." 5 According to Judge Rakoff, favoring the communication of
discounts over surcharges was inconsistent with the First Amendment:
Alice in Wonderland has nothing on section 518 of the New York
General Business Law. Under the most plausible interpretation of
that section, if a vendor is willing to sell a product for $100 cash but
charges $102 when the purchaser pays with a credit card, the vendor
risks prosecution if it tells the purchaser that the vendor is adding a
2% surcharge because the credit card companies charge the vendor
a 2% "swipe fee." But if, instead, the vendor tells the purchaser that
its regular price for the product is $102, but that it is willing to give
the purchaser a $2 discount if the purchaser pays cash, compliance
with section 518 is achieved.116
In 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction and remanded with a mandate to dismiss the
merchants' claims. " 7 Judge Debra Ann Livingston observed that the law did
not regulate speech, concluding that the regulation was aimed at unprotected
conduct only." 8 Judge Livingston explained that "although the difference in
the consumer's reaction to the two pricing schemes may be puzzling purely
as an economic matter, we are aware of no authority suggesting that the First
Amendment prevents states from protecting consumers against irrational
psychological annoyances."11 9 Following the Second Circuit's decision, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that a similar Texas statute targeted unprotected

114. See id.
115. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 449-50
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby preliminarily
enjoins the defendants from enforcing section 518 of the New York General Business Law
during the pendency of this case, and denies defendants' motion to dismiss in full.").
116. Id at 435-36.
117. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 144 (2d Cir. 2015).
118. See id at 131, 133 n.9.
119. Id at 133.
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conduct as well,' 20 while the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Florida's surcharge
ban violated the First Amendment.121
The merchants in Expressions Hair Design filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, which the Court granted in September 2016. The Court also
granted the acting solicitor general's motion for leave to participate in oral
argument.1 22 The merchants argued that the law prevented them from
offering "the truthful statement that [they] are imposing a surcharge for use
of a [credit] card."1 23 "By forbidding the surcharge label," the merchants
asserted, "the statute effectively prevented them from using truthful
information to influence the behavior of their customers."1 24 New York
countered by identifying "a host of long-standing state and federal
statutes ... that prohibit or limit various charges above a merchant's
benchmark price," noting that none have been upset on First Amendment
grounds.1 25

The case generated an impressive volume of amicus briefs: "twelve in
support of the merchants, ten in support of New York, and one (from the
United States) in support of neither party."1 26 Ahead of oral argument,
Professor Mann was skeptical of the merchants' argument: "The biggest
problem with the merchants' position is that their attack may not match the
statute before the court. New York defends its statute as a classic pricing
control-outlawing the specific pricing practice of charging cardholders
more than the list price of a commodity."1 27
During oral argument on January 10, 2017, the lawyers cast the case as
either innocuous price scheming or heavy-handed speech restrictions. 128

120. See Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80-81 (5th Cir. 2016) ("Precisely what the
merchants maintain they are prevented from 'characterizing' is what is prohibited economic
conduct under the law: imposing surcharges.").
121. See Dana's R.R. Supply v. Att'y Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) ("By
holding out discounts as more equal than surcharges, Florida's no-surcharge law overreaches
to police speech well beyond the State's constitutionality prescribed bailiwick. For that reason,
we conclude that § 501.0117 is an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech.").
122. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 615 (2016) ("Motion of the
Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for
divided argument granted.").
123. Argument Preview, supra note 106.
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id.
127. Id
128. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Considers Role of Free Speech in Explaining
Credit Card Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/business/
supreme-court-credit-card-fees-free-speech.html.
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Deepak Gupta, a lawyer for the merchants, framed the issue as all about
truthful speech: "This case is about whether the state may criminalize
truthful speech that merchants believe is their most effective way of
communicating the hidden cost of credit cards to their customers." 2 9 Steven
C. Wu, a lawyer for New York, responded that "[t]he First Amendment
doesn't prohibit the state from using a previously conveyed price as a
baseline for a price regulation."1 30 Eric J. Feigin, a lawyer for the federal
government, added that a law barring a merchant from informing customers
that credit-card users pay more than cash-only customers is constitutional
and comports with the First Amendment.131
Professor Mann detected two themes from oral argument.1 32 First, the
parties could not agree or coalesce around a singular understanding of the
statute. 133 Second, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, tacitly joined by Justices
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, did not equivocate in isolating the
deregulatory concerns animating from this case:
We are diving headlong into an area called price regulation. It is a
form of price regulation, and price regulation goes on all over the
place in regulatory agencies. And so the word that I fear begins with
an "L" and ends with an "R"; it's called Lochner. And there we
go.1 34
Echoing similar thoughts from the two other justices, Justice Breyer
explained how he struggled to conclude from the face of the statute that the
case justified First Amendment scrutiny:
What this statute says is "you can't impose a surcharge." And you
want to. What's that got to do with speech? I grant you, all business
activity takes place through speech. So explain to me what it's got
to do with speech. I don't see that in the statute. My statute that

129. Id
130. Id
13 1. See id.
132. See Mann, supra note 5. Professor Mann detected three themes from oral argument;
however, for purposes of this paper, we will address only two of the three themes.
133. See id.
134. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/7

18

Snyder and Gann: Did Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman Reconstitute the Bygo

2017]

EXPRESSIONS HAIR DESIGN V. SCHNEIDERMAN

239

I'm reading says you can't charge a surcharge. But you can charge
a discount. 135
Adam Liptak, columnist for the New York Times, also observed that
Justice Breyer was alarmed over the implication that "court[s] could use the
First Amendment to strike down ordinary economic regulations."1 36 In the
end, Professor Mann distilled that oral argument yielded scant hints beyond
conjecture, suggesting that the Justices may avoid "directly addressing the
questions that brought the case to the court."1 37
On March 29, 2017, the Court vacated and remanded the judgment in a
unanimous decision, generating an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, a
concurrence in judgment by Justice Breyer in which Justice Sotomayor
joined, and a concurrence in judgment by Justice Sotomayor in which
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined.1 38 Although the Court confirmed the
vaticination of a minimalist approach to resolving the case,1 39 the decision
cemented a long-term project of endorsing a robust definition of what
constitutes speech.' 4 0 The opinion by Chief Justice Roberts did not decide
whether a violation of the First Amendment occurred,141 and it did not
attempt to interpret how the statute operates on the ground in practice.1 42 But
the Court enshrined a 100-year experiment by declaring that conduct either
following or disobeying law is speech subject to some ambit of
constitutional protection. 143
Chief Justice Roberts made transpicuous that even conduct related to
price schemes simpliciter have a valence of free-speech protection:
[A] law requiring all New York delis to charge $10 for their
sandwiches would simply regulate the amount that a store could
collect. In other words, it would regulate the sandwich seller's
conduct. To be sure, in order to actually collect that money, a store
would likely have to put "$10" on its menus or have its employees
tell customers that price. Those written or oral communications

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Liptak, supra note 128.
Mann, supra note 5.
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1146 (2017).
See, e.g., Mann, supra note 5.
See Collins, supra note 99.
Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. at 1151.
See id. at 1150-51.
See id. (internal citation omitted).
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would be speech, and the law by determining the amount
charged would indirectly dictate the content of that speech. But
the law's effect on speech would be only incidental to its primary
effect on conduct, and "it has never been deemed an abridgment of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed."1 44

While that passage couches simple regulations as dictating conduct, it
also suggests that outward manifestations to conform conduct to law is
speech. Though Chief Justice Roberts seeks to reassure that minor
impingements on communicative abilities will not be unconstitutional, the
opinion cannot avoid the obvious implication that a viable, if only fatuous,
First Amendment challenge arises whenever law is followed or disobeyed.
To Chief Justice Roberts, notwithstanding a reasonable difference of
opinion between the Court and two circuit courts of appeal, law is beyond
cavil about speech:
What the law does regulate is how sellers may communicate their
prices .... Accordingly, while we agree with the Court of Appeals

that § 518 regulates a relationship between a sticker price and the
price charged to credit card users, we cannot accept its conclusion
that § 518 is nothing more than a mine-run price regulation. In
regulating the communication of prices rather than prices
themselves, § 518 regulates speech. 145
The upshot of the Court's opinion is that remand was appropriate
because the Second Circuit should determine in the first instance the
constitutional test to apply when considering New York's surcharge
scheme. 146
Justice Breyer the most outwardly fearful justice at oral argument of
Lochner implications-concurred in judgment, arguing that distinguishing

144. Id. at 1150-51 (emphases added and citation omitted).
145. Id. at 1151.
146. The Court also granted, vacated, and remanded the related Fifth Circuit case. See
Rowell v. Pettijohn, 137 S. Ct. 1431, 1432 (2017) (mem.) ("Petition for writ of certiorari
granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,
581 U.S. _, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 197 L.Ed.2d 442 (2017).").
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between conduct and speech no longer makes sense.1 47 Rather, said Justice
Breyer, a court should "simply ask whether, or how, a challenged statute,
rule, or regulation affects an interest that the First Amendment protects."1 48
Justice Breyer descended from that precept to discuss the varying standards
of review for various types of speech, hinting that the New York law at issue
was probably constitutional.1 49 Yet his marching through the standards of
review betrays unresolved concerns advanced during oral argument about
deregulation. Justice Breyer concluded by agreeing with Justice Sotomayor's
concurrence in judgment, 5 0 which argued in broad form for certification of
interpretation of the law to the New York Court of Appeals.1 ''
And with that, while the Court said little about how to resolve the case,
it was emphatic that speech and the First Amendment-are with us and
omnipresent when deciding whether to obey or transgress law. The lingering
question now is whether a case about surcharges constitutionalized all
conduct reacting to law?
C. How Schneiderman Motivates Litigation a la Lochner
That Schneiderman raises the specter of Lochner era deregulation is
salient and intriguingly (or perniciously) possible at the margins. Only time
will tell just how wide and fraught are those margins. That is not to say
Schneidermanportends rejuvenated laissez-faire economics, but a case about
credit-card surcharges could be the impetus to challenge unpopular or
disfavored laws.15 2

147. See Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
148. Id
149. Id at 1153 ("In that case, though affecting the merchant's 'speech,' it would not
hinder the transmission of information to the public; the merchant would remain free to say
whatever it wanted so long as it also revealed its credit-card price to customers. Accordingly,
the law would still receive a deferential form of review.").
150. Id. ("I also agree with Justice Sotomayor that on remand, it may well be helpful for
the Second Circuit to ask the New York Court of Appeals to clarify the nature of the
obligations the statute imposes.").
151. Id. at 1159 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Court's opinion does not
foreclose the Second Circuit from choosing that route on remand. But rather than contributing
to the piecemeal resolution of this case, I would vacate the judgment below and remand with
instructions to certify the case to the New York Court of Appeals to allow it to definitively
interpret § 518. I thus concur only in the judgment.").
152. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Decide or Remand? That's the Question,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Dec.
8,
2014,
3:52 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/
argument-analysis-decide-or-remand-thats-the-question/ ("And, he once again revealed his
anxiety over a ruling that would go against Amtrak, saying that it not only raised the prospect
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Commentary in the wake of Schneiderman reflects that a muchanticipated case was ultimately underwhelming. 53 Professor Mann lamented
that "the only thing this case does is keep the litigation alive," noting that
"the opinion says so little about the First Amendment that it is unlikely to
shed much light on future controversies or illuminate academic inquiry."1 5 4
Professors Daniel Epps and Ian Samuel characterized the case as
"minimalist," while observing that Chief Justice Roberts's opinion may have
started as a concurrence, which garnered a larger coalition than Justice
Sotomayor's eventual concurrence in judgment, because that concurrence in
judgment carried with it an unusually robust procedural recitation.' Daniel
Fisher, a commentator for Forbes, departed slightly from others, discussing
how the case "further strengthens the once controversial Supreme Court
doctrine extending First Amendment protection to corporate, as opposed to
individual speech." 5 6 Another commentator, Ian Millhiser, seemed sanguine
about the prospect that Schneiderman may curb vexatious free-speech
litigation against unpopular laws. 1 The Cato Institute hailed the outcome,
opining that the holding on what constitutes speech was "an obvious

of bringing back the Carter decision from 1936, but also the much-discredited 1905 decision
by the Court in Lochner v. New York the high point of a laissez-faire Court's resistance to
government regulation of business.").
153. See Scott Bomboy, Supreme Court to Sort out Credit Card Merchant Fee Dispute,
NAT'L

CONST.

CTR.:

CONST.

DAILY

(Jan.

9,

2017),

https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/supreme-court-to-sort-out-credit-card-noun-dispute ("If you
pay a different price for a haircut using a credit card rather than cash, what is that price called?
It may seem like splitting hairs, but it's an important free speech matter in front of the
Supreme Court on Tuesday.").
154. Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Offer Minimalist Decision on New York
Credit-Card Surcharge Statute, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar.
30, 2017,
7:01
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-justices-offer-minimalist-decision-newyork-credit-card-surcharge-statute/.
155. Dan Epps & Ian Samuel, Good Behaviour #4: "The Justin Bieber Standard", FIRST
MONDAYS (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.firstmondays.fm/episodes/2017/4/3/good-behaviour-4the-justin-bieber-standard.
156. Fisher, supra note 107.
157. See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Quietly HandedSome Very BadNews to AntiLGBT Businesses, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/thesupreme-court-quietly-handed-some-very-bad-news-to-anti-lgbt-businesses-afle5d7e5287
("This explanation by Roberts-that a law does not raise First Amendment problems simply
because it has some incidental impact on people's speech-may seem obvious, but it hasn't
been obvious at all to conservative litigators seeking to transform the First Amendment into a
weapon against business regulation.").
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conclusion.""' In view of the trajectory of free-speech jurisprudence,
perhaps Schneiderman was obvious indeed. Even so, despite an
unassumingly taciturn approach to the merits of the case, dormant effects on
how free-speech rights affect litigation will rise to the fore.
Doubtless, Schneiderman culminates an ineluctable progression of what
falls within the ambit of the First Amendment, leaving stratagems for how to
raise constitutional challenges in the future. Although Chief Justice Roberts
reassured that simply labeling conduct as speech will not prevent regulation
in the main, 5 9 the Court's holding invites litigation and portends possible
deregulatory success in close cases. Recent litigation has harnessed freespeech rights to challenge disfavored laws, and Schneiderman enables those
challenges to metastasize.
True, easy cases will quickly resolve after Schneiderman, but fault lines
exist in areas of political unrest. Certainly parties could assert that
jaywalking is a form of speech, attempting to upend any enforcement against
the expressive conduct of walking across the street outside the white lines. 160
But few would disagree that traffic laws pass constitutional muster as
rationally related to the public safety interests of local governments. General
laws organizing everyday public interaction and discourse will remain
settled without consequence. The effect of Schneiderman will be felt as laws
gravitate from mundane civic organization to more nuanced and politicized
debates about how we govern ourselves.
At each point along the spectrum of the polarized political divide, the
body politic should greet Schneiderman with circumspection and vigilance.
For those in favor of legislation requiring doctors performing abortions to
explain sonograms and inform the patient about the implications of her
choice,161 Schneiderman makes clear that compelled communication is

158. Ilya Shapiro & Frank Garrison, An Important but Limited Victory for Free Speech,
INST.:
CATO
AT
LBERTY
(Apr.
1,
2017,
4:46
PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/important-limited-victory-free-speech.
159. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017).
160. Cf Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314, 314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
("Appellant was tried and convicted by the court of a violation of Part I, Art. III, § 12(b) of the
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations of the District of Columbia (jaywalking), and
sentenced under Part I, Art. XX, § 158 of the Regulations to pay a fine of $150 or, in default
thereof, under D.C. Code, 16-706 (Supp. V, 1966), to serve 60 days in jail." (internal footnotes
omitted)).
161. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
573 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The amendments require the physician 'who is to perform an abortion' to
perform and display a sonogram of the fetus, make audible the heart auscultation of the fetus
for the woman to hear, and explain to her the results of each procedure and to wait 24 hours, in
most cases, between these disclosures and performing the abortion.").
CATO
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speech subject to a constitutional challenge. 162 The same is true for
advocates wishing to enact laws that preclude doctors from inquiring about
gun ownership when treating patients. Although the Court divided equally
on whether a state could facilitate the payment of collective-bargaining dues
owed by nonunion public workers (save those who opt out),1 63 advocates of
such laws should be leery in the wake of Schneiderman.164 Those in favor of
public accommodation laws against sexual-orientation discrimination also
should understand the import of Schneiderman when businesses refuse to
serve individuals based on an expressed prejudice against a disfavored
sexuality.1 65 Reforms for higher minimum wages likewise will have to
contend with free-speech challenges by businesses wishing to decide wages
for themselves. 166 Less glamorous, yet pervasive, regulations-such as those
requiring physical examinations before dispensing veterinary medicinebear similar difficulties.1 67 Schneiderman may even amplify other

162. See Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. at 1149 n.1 ("[The merchant] displays its prices in this
way, however, only because it considers itself compelled to do so by the challenged law if it
wants to charge different prices.").
163. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) ("And that is because some of [Florida's Firearms Owners' Privacy Act's] provisions
regulate speech on the basis of content, restricting (and providing disciplinary sanctions for)
speech by doctors and medical professionals on the subject of firearm ownership.").
164. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1083 (2016), for how the
Court was split on the issue decided in Friedrichsv. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, No. SACV 13-676JLS CWX, 2013 WL 9825479, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2015), whether the State's requirement
for teachers to make financial contributions to any union was a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
165. See, e.g., State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548 (Wash. 2017)
("Stutzman defended on the grounds that the WLAD and CPA do not apply to her conduct and
that, if they do, those statutes violate her state and federal constitutional rights to free speech,
free exercise, and free association. The Benton County Superior Court granted summary
judgment to the State and the couple, rejecting all of Stutzman's claims. We granted review
and now affirm.").
166. See, e.g., Int'l Franchise Ass'n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 409 (9th Cir. 2015)
("It is clear that the ordinance was not motivated by a desire to suppress speech, the conduct at
issue is not franchisee expression, and the ordinance does not have the effect of targeting
expressive activity.").
167. See, e.g., Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 2015) ("Texas requires
veterinarians to conduct a physical examination of an animal or its premises before they can
practice veterinary medicine with respect to that animal. In this case, we must decide whether
this requirement violates the First or Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude it offends
neither.").
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constitutional provisions, morphing cases about open-carry gun rights into
cases about self-expression. 168
While clarity and certainty elude these issues, a dose of common sense
should disinfect free-speech infirmities for laws in which no serious dispute
exists over their beneficence. Rational optimism remains that antitrust laws
and the like will not be reassessed under Schneiderman.169 Hope endures
that the right to free speech does not license the freestyle spread of racism by
70
denying public accommodations on the basis of race.o
And trust persists
that Schneiderman can never excuse the hanging of a "Whites Only" sign
outside a business' 7 ' or the naming of an establishment in a manner that
besmirches the progress of a mature society writ large and writ small. 172
As Justice Antonin Scalia once observed, discerning when a catalyzing
issue foments change can be difficult and is often rationalized away as a
minor ebb in a larger flow:

168. See, e.g., Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2014) ("Plaintiffs
do discuss 'symbolic speech' and argue that 'Plaintiffs' First Amendment [free speech] rights
were infringed by the officers when their walk was interrupted and they were detained for
promoting open carry."').
169. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("Such an
expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as
many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.").
170. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) (upholding Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis that the congressional record is "replete with testimony
of the burdens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination"); see also Jones v. City
of Boston, 738 F. Supp. 604, 605 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting that calling a patron an
ethnophaulism at a bar despite serving him still satisfies the Title II requirement "of
showing that he was denied equal access to a place of public accommodation on the basis of
race" because "[t]he term 'n****r' is intimidating by its very nature"); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966) ("This court refuses to lend credence or
support to his position that he has a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of the
Negro race in his business establishments upon the ground that to do so would violate his
sacred religious beliefs.").
171. See, e.g., United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 3, 16 (5th Cir. 1963) ("Since
1956 the City of Jackson, Mississippi, has maintained sidewalk signs adjacent to the
Greyhound, Trailways, and Illinois Central terminals. These signs read, 'Waiting Room for
White Only By Order Police Department' and 'Waiting Room for Colored Only By Order
Police Department.' . . . [S]egregation in interstate transportation violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment offends the Commerce Clause.") (footnote omitted).
172. See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Reyna, J., dissenting)
("Whether a restaurant named 'S***S NOT WELCOME' would actually serve a Hispanic
patron is hardly the point. The mere use of the demeaning mark in commerce communicates a
discriminatory intent as harmful as the fruit produced by the discriminatory conduct.").
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Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so
to speak, in sheep's clothing: the potential of the asserted principle
to effect important change in the equilibrium of power is not
immediately evident, and must be discerned by a careful and
perceptive analysis. But this wolf comes as a wolf.1 73

Whether Schneiderman is a wolf remains to be seen
stay on guard.

but it is best to

IV. CONCLUSION

Schneiderman marks the completion of one thing and the start of
another. In essence, while one door closed in 1937,174 another opened in
2017.175 Having reconciled what is speech, the unexplored frontier begs
what is permissible regulation. Although no easy answers exist, the resultant
uncertainty suggests that more is in flux than meets the eye.1 76 The idea that
speech can be used as a vehicle against a wide array of laws should give
pause to everyone, no matter their variegated political affiliation or alliance.
A muscular reading of Schneiderman that all conduct is a form of speech
could hobble all laws and regulations, whether federal, state, or local.
Schneiderman is not a clarion call to deregulate into a laissez-faire society,
but some may use the First Amendment for just such an outcome. A cautious
and tepid response to the idea that all conduct is speech would prevent a
return to Lochner, but an enthusiastic response would spark a revival. Can
too much speech ever be a bad thing? If an inflection point toward harm
exists, we may be on the precipice of learning just how powerful speech has
become.

173. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937).
175. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150-52 (2017).
176. Cf Stephen King, Stephen King on Donald Trump: 'How Do Such Men Rise? First
as a Joke', GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/apr/01/stephen-king-on-donald-trump-fictional-voters-truth-about-us-election?CM
P=othb-aplnewsd-1 (theorizing that general national uncertainty regarding policy follows
from officials with little experience being elected to positions of power); Rick Esenberg,
Symposium: Whitford is Nothing New, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 9, 2017, 2:24 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-whitford-nothing-new/ (noting that creating
voting districts to ensure proportional "wasted" votes among political parties is not a
constitutional right).
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